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Re-examining Southern Commitment to War
“The dogs of war," writes Emory Thomas in this provocative little book (a
“nonfiction novella," he calls it, “Clio laconic"), “once loosed, seldom go where
we want them to. Once slipped, they run wild" (92). Thomas is, of course, a
prolific scholar of the Civil War era. His many publications, focusing on the
Confederate experience, have shed new light on the revolutionary nature of the
Southern government, the qualities of Confederate military leadership , and the
life of Robert E. Lee. With this latest effort, he plays the provocateur once more,
and he does not disappoint.
Thomas’s subject is the secession winter, that period leading up to the firing
on Fort Sumter. The simple question he poses, and seeks to answer, is as vexing
as it is direct: “what were they thinking?" (ix). Time after time, those who, at
least in our retrospective judgment, ought to have known better, miscalculated.
The result was the bloodiest war in American history.
How could it have happened? Thomas makes clear that war was a matter of
choice. But choices must be informed, and to a remarkable degree those made by
Union and Confederate leadership were not so much uninformed as
misinformed. Abraham Lincoln and much of his cabinet did not believe that,
when pressed, the Confederacy would actually take up arms, thus woefully
underestimating the depth of support for secession and independence in the
South. Jefferson Davis and much of the Confederate leadership did not believe
that Yankees possessed the determination to sustain a fight. Lincoln, who had
never experienced war himself, even after Sumter, did not grasp the nature of the
impending conflict. Hence, his call for 75,000 volunteers envisioned a maximum
90 days of service. Davis, a veteran of the Mexican War, was much more
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clear-headed, and yet believed that, in the end, the Confederacy would prevail in
a test of wills.
Only General Winfield Scott, the most distinguished military man of the
first half of the nineteenth century, fully understood what lay ahead and offered
four policy options to Secretary of State William Seward: accept a compromise
extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific and thus guarantee new
territory into which slavery might expand; do nothing to provoke conflict, and
even attempt to collect tariff duties offshore; allow the southern states to secede
peaceably; or go to war. Scott knew the consequences of that last option. War
would require at least 300,000 troops, would last at least three years and would
result in “fifteen devastated provinces! … held for generations by heavy
garrisons, at an expense quadruple the net duties or taxes which it would be
impossible to extort from them" (47). Lincoln viewed this advice as “too
political" (47).
As Thomas’s narrative winds down to its inevitable, tragic denouement, it
also discovers timely analogies. Scott, too familiar with the reality of war, is
Colin Powell in 1991, urging restraint. Davis, after the Confederate victory at
First Manassas, essentially announces “mission accomplished." Lest there be any
doubt, Thomas concludes, “I believe that the American Civil War offers insight
and enlightenment about the human condition to inform the present…. Perhaps
there is a parable here. I believe in redemption" (92).
Such present-mindedness, off-putting when wielded as a blunt political
instrument, is rather more instructive in Thomas’s skilled hands. The author
cautions against the familiar, dangerous words, “History teaches us …." General
Robert E. Lee himself used such a formulation, noting that History’s lesson is
one of hope. Perhaps. And yet … in this brief, lucid, and challenging extended
essay, a fine historian embraces what the great Herbert Butterfield describes as
the “tragic" mode. Policy makers could do worse than to read the tragedians – or
to learn from Emory Thomas.
John M. McCardell, Jr., is currently Vice-Chancellor and President at the
University of the South. He is the author of The Idea of a Southern Nation as
well as numerous essays on the Civil War era.
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